Vardanyan's Theorem states that the set of PA-valid principles of Quantified Modal Logic, QML, is complete Π 0 2 . We generalize this result to a wide class of theories. The crucial step in the generalization is avoiding the use of Tennenbaum's Theorem.
Introduction
The idea of assigning structures of kind Y to structures of kind X other in order to obtain information is a useful methodology in mathematics. The structures of kind Y are often simpler and better understood. Provability logic is a case in point: we assign to arithmetical theories certain propositional modal logics that are in many respects simpler than the original theories. These modal logics give us full information about arithmetical reasoning of a certain restricted sort. A disadvantage of this approach is that provability logic does not yield differential information: the modal logic assigned is the same for a wide class of reasonable theories. The situation becomes a bit better when we expand the modal language. One possible extension is to a propositional modal language with a binary predicate for relative interpretability. In this case salient classes of theories receive different but simple logics. See e.g. [JdJ98] and [Vis98] . Another possible expansion is to a predicate logical modal language. Here we certainly do have differential information about the original theories. Vardanyan's theorem concerns this situation. Vardanyan's Theorem tells us that the set of PA-valid principles of Quantified Modal Logic, QML, is complete Π 0 2 . Thus, the PA-valid modal principles are more complicated than the theory PA itself. Clearly, the result can be viewed as a negative result for the case of PA.
Vardanyan's Theorem was discovered by V.A. Vardanyan in 1985 . See [Var86] . Vardanyan's work used earlier ideas of V.E. Plisko (see [Pli77] , [Pli78] , [Pli83] , [Pli93] ) and S. Artemov (see [Art85] ). Vardanyan's Theorem was discovered independently but slightly later by Vann McGee. The first published version of McGee's result is in his 1985 PhD Thesis. We will generalize Vardanyan's result to a wide class of arithmetical theories, containing all theories in the language of arithmetic that extend Elementary Arithmetic EA, ie. I∆ 0 + Exp.
1
Let me point out that if we just consider the valid schemes for (non-modal) predicate logic, then, for a large class of theories, we get no specific information: e.g. for Σ 0 1 -sound arithmetical theories you get precisely predicate logic. However, if you look at non-arithmetical theories there are many possibilities. See [Yav97] . It has been shown that there is a Σ 0 1 -unsound arithmetical theory such that the set of its predicate logical valid principles is complete Π 0 2 . See [Vis02] . the main theorem of the present paper extends Vardanyan's Theorem to a wide range of theories. Here is a first crude statement of our theorem. Theorem 1.1 Consider a theory T in the language of arithmetic. We assume that the axiom-set of T is simple, e.g. p-time decidable. If T is a Σ Closer inspection of the argument gives us a more refined, but less memorable statement. Theorem 1.2 Consider a theory T in the language of arithmetic. We assume that the axiom-set of T is simple, e.g. p-time decidable. Suppose (i) that T is an extension of EA such that T + Con 2 (T ) is consistent or (ii) that T is an finite extension of S 
The Basic Form of the Argument
In this section, we present the basic scheme of the argument. As given here the argument, and especially the soundness part of it, can still be improved. We will do this in section 5.
Let an arithmetical theory T be given. We demand that T is sufficiently strong and sufficiently sound. The amount of strongness and soundness needed is dependent on the further details of the proof. We will specify what is needed later. What we are looking for is a reduction of the truth of Π 0 2 -sentences P := ∀x∃y P 0 (x, y), for P 0 ∈ ∆ 0 , to the T -valid principles of QML. We will, in an effective way, associate a suitable modal sentenceP to P such that P is true iffP is T -valid.
The modal language L 2 that we will employ, extends the relational variant L of the language of arithmetic which contains the predicates Z, S, A, M and E (for identity), which are resp. 1,2,3,3,2-ary. There will, of course, be the modal operator 2, but also an additional predicate X which in the usual approaches is unary and in our approach is 0-ary. The general proof strategy is as follows: we have to find L 2 -formulas A and B(x, X) with the following properties: † A is in L. We demand that A implies (in predicate logic) (Q) . Here Q is the single sentence axiomatization of Robinson's Arithmetic. Let e be the interpretation of L that sends S(x, y) to Sx = y, etc. We demand that T + A e is sufficiently sound. We will specify later how much soundness is needed. ‡ Define ν 0 (z) := Z(z) and ν n+1 (z) := ∃u (ν n (u) ∧ S(u, z)).
2 We demand that, for every (·) , there is an n such that:
£ A certain class of formulas Γ is specified, such that, for every i, there is a Tformula C (of the arity of X) in Γ such that if (∃z(ν n (z) ∧ B(z, X))
is true, then n ≥ i. Here e[X := C] has the obvious meaning: it is e extended to an interpretation that translates X to C.
We take asP the formula: (A → ∃z (B(z, X)∧ (∀x<z ∃y P 0 (x, y)) )). We reason as follows.
Completeness: Suppose P is true. Consider any (·) . By ( ‡), there is an n such that (a): T (A → ∃z (ν n (z) ∧ B(z))) . Clearly, ∀x<n ∃y P 0 (x, y). Hence, Q ∀x<n ∃y P 0 (x, y). Using ( †), we can transform the Q-proof witnessing this last fact to a T -proof witnessing (b):
Combining (a) and (b), we find: T P .
Soundness: Conversely, supposeP is T -valid. Let i be an arbitrary number. Let C be the formula in Γ promised for i by (£). Consider the interpretation e C := e[X := C]. We find:
Hence, T + A e ∃z (B e C (z, X) ∧ ∀x<z ∃y P 0 (x, y)). We assume that T + A e is sound for sentences of the form ∃z (B e C (z, X) ∧ ∀x<z ∃y P 0 (x, y)) for C ∈ Γ. It follows that ∀x<i ∃y P 0 (x, y). The number i was arbitrary, hence we find that P is true.
The Magic Formulas A and B
In this section we discuss various ways of constructing A and B. In subsection 4.2, we prove theorem 1.1.
Plisko and Vardanyan
The formula A associated to Vardanyan's work is the formula (B) ∧D ∧E. Here 'B' is the formula Boolos calls 'T ' and D and E are as in Boolos' presentation. We have:
e . Plisko used for B a formula expressing 'X is not a truthpredicate for sentences of complexity x'. Here we may take as complexity measure the one corresponding to the arithmetical hierarchy. One nice aspect of this approach is that B is entirely boxfree.
3 The unary formulas C provided by (£) will be truthpredicates for complexity i. To make this strategy work we need make A so strong that modulo provable equivalence A implies that (·) restricted to the arithmetical part of the language is equivalent to e. To do this, we need to apply an arithmetized version of Tennenbaum's Theorem. The application of Tennenbaum's Theorem will need at least that T contains IΣ 1 . A detailed verification of this fact will be given in Maartje de Jonge's forthcoming paper.
Note that, with Plisko's B, we need C of arbitrary complexity, so a reasonable choice of Γ will be the set of all formulas of the arithmetical language. Thus, if we follow the proof outlined in section 3, we will need true extensions of IΣ 1 in the arithmetical language. Closer inspection of the argument will reveal that a slightly adapted version works for extensions T of IΣ 1 such T + Con(T ) is consistent. See also Maartje de Jonge's forthcoming paper.
The B used in Boolos' presentation of Vardanyan's argument is roughly 'x is a recursive index of the set {y | 2X(y)}'. Using the argument of section 3 this argument would work for Σ 0 3 -sound extensions of IΣ 1 . However, one can refine the argument in such a way that the weaker demand that T + Con(T ) is consistent, is sufficient. See also Maartje de Jonge's forthcoming paper.
Our Choice for A and B
We want to find A and B that work for a wide range of theories. It turns out that the wonderful idea of using an arithmetized version of Tennenbaum's theorem is the main obstacle to progress. In the construction below, we simply avoid the need to use of Tennenbaum's Theorem.
We demand that T is a Σ 0 1 -sound extension of elementary arithmetic EA, also known as I∆ 0 + Exp. Here Exp is the axiom stating that exponentiation is total. Later we will show how to improve this condition: the result holds also for certain weak arithmetics and we need less soundness. Here is a brief description of EA.
1. EA is finitely axiomatizable. We will employ a finite axiomatization of EA.
2. The provably recursive functions of EA are precisely the elementary functions.
3. EA implies Σ 6. EA does not prove cutelimination for predicate logic, which requires superexponentiation.
7. EA does not prove Σ 0 1 -collection:
where D 0 ∈ ∆ 0 1 . A suitable finite axiomatization of the axioms of identity is supposed to be incorporated in EA. We take X 0-ary. To improve readability, we write G for G ∧ 2G. Here are our A and B:
To verify the satisfaction of ( †), note that T A e . So, all we need is that T is sufficiently sound. Note that, for any C, ∃z (B e C (z, X) ∧ ∀x<z ∃y P 0 (x, y)) is Σ 0 1 . Hence, we will only need that our theory is Σ 0 1 -sound. We will improve this estimate in section 5.
We verify ( ‡). Let G := ∃x G 0 (x) and H := ∃y H 0 (y), for arbitrary G 0 and H 0 . We write:
Consider any (·) . By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma, we may find a Σ
We interpolate two lemmas. 
Proof
Reason in T + A . Given S we can find a Q-proof π of S. The proof π can be transformed into a T -proof π of (Q → S ) . (In fact this transformation is p-time.) By A , there is a T -proof τ of (Q) . Combining π with τ , we find a T -proof τ of (S ) . 2
The next lemma is a minor variation on a consequence of the Friedman-GoldfarbHarrington Theorem. See [Vis02] for a detailed discussion of this theorem.
Lemma 4.2 We have:
. It follows, by ∆ 0 -induction, that:
In the first case, we have R. Hence, by lemma 4.1, Bew T [(R) ]. In the second case, we have Bew T [(R) ] immediately.
For the converse, suppose Bew T [(R) ]. It follows that:
In the first case, we have Bew T [X ]. In the second case, we have, by lemma 4.1,
In 
}. This is a theory in predicate logic extending Q, hence we may apply the Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington Theorem to U . The fallacy in this argument is a silent application of Σ 0 1 -collection. The provability predicate of U will not be verifiably Σ 0 1 . Of course, there are many ways to repair the argument, however, given the fact that the proofs of our two lemmas are quite short, why bother? Lemma 4.2 gives us:
Suppose r is the Gödelnumber of R. We have: EA R ↔ True Σ 0 1 (r), and, hence, EA R ↔ ∃z (z = r ∧ True Σ 0 1 (z)). We can transform the witnessing EA-proof of this last fact into a (T + A )-proof, thus obtaining:
Using the fact that T + A Bew T [A ], we now obtain:
We now want to 'export' the ∃z (ν (z) ∧ . . . to the outside of the Bew[. . .]'s. We indicate the obvious steps. Evidently, we have:
Moreover,
Clearly, T +A ∃z ν (z). By equation (6) and the fact that T +A
. Hence, using equation (5), we find:
. Combining this with equation (4), using the fact that A implies that E is a congruence w.r.t. the relations of L, we find:
Clearly equation (7) gives us the promised T (A → ∃z (ν r (z) ∧ B(z, X))) .
We proceed to derive (£). We define, for any arithmetical formula G,
Consider any natural number i. Suppose that for every C there would be an n < i such that (∃z (ν n (z) ∧ B(z, X)) e[X:=C] is true. It would follow, by the Pidgeon Hole Principle, that for some n, m and k with m > k > 0, we would have: 
Sharpening the Soundness Condition
How sound should our theories T be? We will look into the matter by refining the completeness part of the argument in section 3 a bit.
It seems fair to me to demand that the theories we consider satisfy the demand that T + Con(T ) is consistent. If it is not, the modal part of the language trivializes and we are really looking at the non-modal predicate logics of theories.
Let's briefly look at the excluded case that T + Con(T ) is inconsistent, i.o.w. that T Bew T [⊥]. Clearly, the question of complexity reduces to the question whether the ordinary, non-modal, predicate logic of T is complete Π 0 2 . Well, anything is possible. For example, if T is finitely axiomatized, the logic of T + Bew T [⊥] is precisely predicate logic plus the axioms 2A for all A. This is an immediate consequence of the results of [Vis02] . On the other hand, the results of [Vis02] show that there is a consistent arithmetical extension of, say, IΣ 1 +Bew IΣ1 [⊥] such that the set of valid predicate logical principles is complete Π 0 1 .
As will be shown in Maartje de Jonge's forthcoming paper, a refinement of the original Vardanyan argument works for extensions T of IΣ 1 such that T + Con(T ) is consistent. Thus, w.r.t. soundness the original result is, in a sense, optimal. The result of this paper asks for less strength. However, we will need a bit more soundness: T + Con 2 (T ) has to be consistent.
Suppose T is a theory in the language of arithmetic, extending EA. Suppose further that T + := T + Con 2 (T ) is consistent. We will show that the set of T -valid QML-sentences is complete Π 0 2 . This proves (i) of theorem 1.2. Consider P := ∀x∃y P 0 (x, y), where P 0 ∈ ∆ 0 1 . Let P 1 (x) := ∃y P 0 (x, y). By the Gödel Fixed Point Lemma we may find Q 1 (x) ∈ ∆ 0 1 such that
By the FGH theorem (see [Vis02] ; see also lemma 4.2), we have, for any n, P 1 (n) ⇔ T + Q 1 (n). Suppose Q 1 (x) := ∃y Q 0 (x, y), where Q 0 (x, y) ∈ ∆ 0 1 . Let Q := ∀x ∃y Q 0 (x, y). Again, by the FGH theorem, we have that P is true iff Q is true. Now we repeat the argument of section 3 for T with Q in the role of P . The completeness part remains the same. We sharpen the soundness part as follows. Suppose thatQ is T -valid. Specializing this to the e C , we obtain, for any C:
Consider some number N . We have:
Hence:
Consider ω ∪ {∞} with the obvious ordering. We construct the following Kripke frame F on ω ∪ {∞}:
n ≺ m ⇔ (m ≤ N and n = m + N + 1) or (n > 2N + 1 and m < n).
The frame specified is the frame of a tail-model (see [Vis84] ). By the result of [Vis84] , we can embed the algebra of propositions given by the finite and the co-finite sets of nodes into T using a Solovay function h. 4 The statements S n :↔ ∃u hu = n for n ≤ N represent the propositions p n := {n}. Clearly, for n, m ≤ N with n = m, we have F |= 2(2p n ↔ 2p m ) → 22⊥. Hence, by the embedding lemma,
By elementary reasoning involving the Pigheon Hole Principle we find:
. Contraposing, we find:
Since N was arbitrary, we may conclude that, for any n, T + Q 1 (n). By the FGH property, it follows that P is true. Hence, P is true iff Q is true iffQ is T -valid.
Open Question 5.1 Is there a theory T in the language of arithmetic that extends EA such that T + Con(T ) is consistent, for which Vardanyan's Theorem does not hold?
A curious aspect of our argument is that I do not know how to produce the analogues of the S i for S 
Adapting the Argument to Weak Theories
We show how to adapt our argument to certain extensions of Buss' theory S 1 2 . Regretably the full description of the reasoning is rather long, so we will just sketch the main ingredients of the adaptation.
The results of this section in combination with the considerations of the previous section will give us (ii) of theorem 1.2. Here is a brief description of S 1 2 . For a detailed discussion, see [Bus86] or [HP91] .
1. S 1 2 is finitely axiomatizable. We employ a finite axiomatization of S 4. We do not know how to formalize Rosser style arguments in S 1 2 . However, some Rosser style theorems, such as Rosser's original theorem, can be formalized using a different argument. See subsection 6.3.
The theories for which we can also prove Vardanyan's Theorem are the theories in the arithmetical language that are either finite extensions of S 1 2 or finite extensions of the stronger theory I∆ 0 + Ω 1 . We will describe below the points where we have to change the argument. We will aim at adapting our argument, replacing EA by S 1 2 everywhere.
Efficient Numerals
The definition of quantifying in involves the num-function which sends a number to the Gödelnumber of its numeral. This function will, when naively formalized, be of exponential growth. However, we do not have exponentiation in weak theories. The usual way to solve this problem is to employ dyadic numerals given by the mapping BNUM:
• BNUM(0) := 0,
Let bnum be the function sending n to the Gödel number of BNUM(n). Under a reasonable coding scheme the bnum function is polynomial. We replace the use of num, by the use of bnum.
We might wish also to replace the predicates ν n with predicates β n corresponding to efficient numerals. For our specific argument this is not necessary, since we are only using ν n for standard n.
Truth Predicate
A somewhat more serious business is the fact that S 1 2 cannot verify the properties of the Σ 0 1 -truth predicate. There are two ways to get around thus restriction. The first is by noting that our sentences R C have the specific form:
Now take as measure of complexity ρ which counts just depth of quantifier changes. Note that all sentences of the form R C have complexity below K, for some standard K. We can build a truth predicate True such that, for all sentences H of complexity ≤ K, we have: S 
where s is the Gödel number of S. Now we use the alternative fixed
Adapting the FGH Theorem
We have to find an alternative proof for:
. This is one of the corollaries of the FGH theorem. Our earlier proof used the principles
However, we only know how to prove these facts in the presence of Exp as part of T . Also we used:
This fact can only be verified if T extends I∆ 0 + Ω 1 (as far as we know). Fortunately, for a number of theories, there is another road. We useŠvejdar's Principle. 5 Inspecting the main proof of [VV94] , one can show, for any finitely axiomatized theory U extending S 1 2 (or even a weaker theory like Q), or for any extension U by finitely many axioms of I∆ 0 + Ω 1 , that:
The argument uses the fact that inside Bew U in the consequent, we will have a U -proof of G in any definable U -cut and, hence, a U -proof of H in any definable U -cut. We can adapt the proof of theŠvejdar's Principle to our context to obtain:
The reason that this adaptation works is that for the original argument it is irrelevant what the interpretation of number theory employed for the formalization of syntax inside U is. Also we have:
The argument for this fact is similar to the proof of fact 2.7 of [Vis02] .
5 First formulated in [Šve83] .
UsingŠvejdar's Principle, we cannot recover the full FGH principle, but we can get the principle we need. We reproduce the argument for the case we are interested in. We have:
The argument for the adapted version ofŠvejdar's Principle also yields, for any S 1 2 -cut I,
Using this variant we can easily get the desired facts for Z of subsection 6.2.
Variations
The result above is remarkably robust against all kinds of variations. The first possible variation is to consider relative interpretations in the definition of schematic validity instead of unrelativized interpretations as we did. Everything simply goes through. We might wish to move in the other direction, e.g. restricting ourselves to interpretations where identity translates only to identity. Again there are no poblems. A somewhat more interesting variation is to consider as our theories pairs T , N , where T is a theory in some arbitrary language and N is a relative interpretation of EA in T . We redefine our notion of validity for the modal language in such a way that the quantifiers of the modal language are interpreted as ranging over δ N , the domain associated with N . Again Vardanyan's Theorem will work for this notion of validity. Under this interpretation, we can extend Vardanyan's Theorem to such theories as ZFC and GB.
It is unknown to me whether our result can be sharpened -as Vardanyan improved his original theorem-to a predicate logical language with just one unary predicate symbol. It could very well be that Vardanyan's argument can be copied here, but I did not try.
